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Abstract
This article examines the legal issues pertaining to the use of
civilian armed guards on board Danish-flagged ships for
protection against piracy. The Danish model of regulation is
interesting for several reasons. Firstly, the Danish Govern-
ment was among the first European flag States to allow and
formalise their use in a commercial setting. Secondly, the
distribution of assignments between public authorities and
private actors stands out as very pragmatic, as ship owners
and contracting private security companies are empowered
with competences which are traditionally considered as pub-
lic administrative powers. Thirdly, the lex specialis frame-
work governing the authorisation and use of force in self-
defence is non-exhaustive, thus referring to lex generalis
regulation, which does not take the special circumstances
surrounding the use of armed guards into consideration. As
a derived effect the private actors involved rely heavily on
soft law and industry self-regulation instrument to comple-
ment the international and national legal framework.
Keywords: Piracy, Private security companies (PSC), Private-
ly contracted armed security personnel (PCASP), Use of
force, Denmark
1 Introduction
Danish ships and foreign-flagged ships controlled by
Danish-based ship owners1 are represented in statistics
as victims of what is commonly referred to as modern
piracy.2 Pirate attacks in the waters off the coast of
Somalia constitutes a continuous threat to one of the
most vital trading areas, as the Gulf of Aden serves as
the passage to the Suez Canal, which ties together the
* Christian Frier is research assistant at the Department of Law, University
of Southern Denmark. He obtained his PhD in Law in March 2019.
1. The trade and employer organisation ‘Danish Shipping’ represents
around ninety ship owners and offshore companies. An estimated
twenty ship owners operate ships under Danish flag, and the same
number of ship owners operate ships under foreign flags, available at:
https://www.danishshipping.dk/en/om-os/ (last visited 2 January
2019).
2. D. Guilfoyle, Modern Piracy: Legal Challenges and Responses (2013), x.
See for other phrasing with similar meaning ‘contemporary piracy’; see
also A. Petrig, ‘Piracy’, in D. Rothwell, A.O. Elferink, K. Scott and
T. Stephens (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Law of the Sea (2015)
843.
Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea. This pivotal trad-
ing route is often navigated by commercial ships flying
the Danish flag. When Somali-based piracy peaked in
2011, the number of Danish ships passing the canal rep-
resented the seventh largest total, and only surpassed by
the Maltese and the British fleet when non-European
States are overlooked.3 Keeping in mind that the transit
ratio does not provide a full-scale picture of the number
of Danish ships engaged in commercial activities in the
adjacent waters, it does indicate the minimum number
of ships exposed to Somali-based piracy.4 As a result of
such presence, several hijacking attempts and successful
kidnappings involving Danish ships have taken place in
the past decade. Starting with the hijacking of DANICA
WHITE in 2007,5 this incident was special because the
coaster kept a safe distance of 200 nautical miles to the
Somalian shore, which at that time complied to interna-
tional safety recommendations.6 Other noteworthy
hijackings involved the tugboat SVITZER KORSA-
KOV and the Bahamas-flagged, but Danish-operated,
freighter CEC FUTURE in 2008.7 In all these cases, the
seafarers were held captive on board their respective
vessels for a period between forty-six and eighty-three
days before being released against ransom payments.
The most notable incident followed in the beginning of
2011 with the hijacking of the Danish coaster LEOP-
ARD.8 The crew, two Danes and four Filipinos, was
held captive on Somalian ground for 838 days before the
seafarers were released against ransom payment in 2013.
This hijacking incident was subject to extensive media
coverage under the slogan ‘get our seafarers home’. The
3. Suez Canal Annual Report 2011, Part 1: Ship Traffic, Table 15. All
annual reports can be obtained on www.suezcanal.gov.eg/English/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited 1 February 2019).
4. Around seventy Danish ships are at Any Given Time Navigating in Pira-
cy-prone Waters, available at: https://www.danishshipping.dk/en/
policy/pirateri/ (last visited 1 February 2019).
5. ‘DANICA WHITE – Piratoverfald og kapring den 1. juni 2007’ (Danish
text), Danish Maritime Authority Investigation, November 2007.
6. A. Petrig and R. Geiss, Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The Legal
Framework for Counter-piracy Operations in Somalia and the Gulf of
Aden (2011) 10, note 46.
7. The incident was subject to Danish criminal jurisdiction, because the
kidnappers contacted the Danish branch to negotiate ransom payment;
see B. Feldtmann, ‘Er strafferet et effektivt middel i kampen mod
sørøveri?’, in Liber Amicarum et Amicorum Karin Cornlis (2010)
113-117.
8. Danish Maritime Accident Investigation Board Report: ‘Piratoverfald d.
12. januar 2011’ (Danish text) can be obtained on http://
www.dmaib.dk/Sider/Forside.aspx (last visited 1 February 2019).
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combined ransom payments in the mentioned cases
amounted to a staggering 8 million euros and impelled
both criminal investigations and civil lawsuits.9
Through that prism, Somali-based piracy has a direct
impact on Danish interests’ in the broadest sense. As a
result, counter-piracy responses were swiftly considered
a key policy issue as stipulated by the Danish Govern-
ment in the first ‘Strategy for the Danish Counter-Pira-
cy Effort’ dating back from 2011.10
1.1 The ‘Three Pillars’ of the Strategy
The governments’ reaction towards piracy has been
holistic and encompasses all three ‘pillars’ as described
by Feldtmann in her contribution to this special issue.
Danish warships have been deployed in coalition forces,
including, but not limited to, Operation Ocean Shield
and the EU Operation ATALANTA.11 The presence of
warships brought some stability to the region in the
form of the International Recommended Transit Corri-
dor (IRTC). But efforts also revealed shortcomings, as
pirates started to expand their operation area by using
so-called mother ships, which are able to carry smaller
skiffs and equipment on much longer distances.12 In
addition to this development, law enforcement opera-
tions led to frustration due to so-called catch and
release-strategies and unsuccessful attempts to prose-
cute alleged pirates in Danish courts. Moreover, the
Prosecution Service was criticised by the Danish High
Court for neglecting constitutional rights of individuals
retained on a Danish warship13 as well as scholarly criti-
cism for completing an extradition of individuals to the
Seychelles. Also, the government’s attention has been
directed to diplomacy and regional capacity building to
address the root courses of piracy.14 Among the drivers
is the non-functional government of Somalia with the
subsequent lack of stewardship and effective control of
own territorial waters. Other factors include dumping
and illegal fishing, which have a negative impact on fish
9. U2011.354 Ø (Danish case law) in which the High Court in a civil law-
suit ruled against the crew members of DANICA WHITE. The judges
argued on the merits of the case, especially that the ship owner was not
negligent.
10. ‘Strategy for the Danish Counter-Piracy Effort 2011-2014’, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Denmark, May 2011 (hereafter antipiracy strategy
2011); replaced by the ‘Strategy for the Danish Measures against Piracy
and Armed Robbery at Sea 2015-2018’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Denmark, March 2015 (hereafter antipiracy strategy 2015); and cur-
rently in force the ‘Priority Paper for the Danish Efforts to Combat Pira-
cy and Other Types of Maritime Crime 2019-2022’, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Denmark, November 2018 (hereafter antipiracy strategy
2019).
11. B. Feldtmann, ‘Jura som led i dansk aktivistisk udenrigspolitik til søs’,
90(1) Økonomi og Politik 11-23 (2017).
12. Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime
Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea
(hereinafter BMP5); see also A. Petrig, ‘The Use of Force and Firearms
by Private Maritime Security Companies against Suspected Pirates’,
62(3) ICLQ 668 (2013).
13. U 2014.1044 Ø (Danish case law).
14. M.D. Evans and S. Galani, ‘Piracy and the Development of International
Law’, in P. Koutrakos and A. Skordas (eds.), The Law and Practice of
Piracy at Sea (2015) 362.
stocks and marine environment,15 ultimately ‘pushing’
local fishermen to pursue other sources of income.
These underlying issues, whether acting alone or in
concert, have led the Danish Government to support
long-haul initiatives to eradicate Somali-based piracy.16
Nevertheless, such efforts provide no immediate com-
fort against pirates on the lurk for venerable commercial
ships and on that background the way was paved for the
controversial policy of allowing Privately Contracted
Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) on board Danish-
flagged ships. At the time of writing, the Danish naval
fleet is no longer active in counter-piracy operations and
no individuals have been prosecuted for the act of piracy
in Danish courtrooms.
When discussions for additional security measures first
took off in 2008, the initial call from the shipping indus-
try focused on the use of ‘state agents’ in the form of
marine or military personnel, commonly referred as ves-
sel protection detachment personnel teams (VPD
teams).17 The industry’s line of argumentation followed
from the concept of state protection, theoretically cap-
tured in the doctrine of ‘monopoly of force’, despite not
voicing the notion itself. VPD teams had previously
been deployed on commercial ships for transportation of
military equipment to the Danish troops’ campaign in
Afghanistan, and on board ships carrying supplies to
Somalia on behalf of the UN World Food Programme.18
These deployments were nevertheless considered as
exceptions, and it was clear from the very beginning that
the government did not intend to formalise the arrange-
ment, as the request was swiftly turned down. The rea-
soning, according to the Minister of Defence, was that it
would create an undesirable precedent if Danish soldiers
were to provide protection for Danish ships rather than
take part in international coalitions to the greater benefit
of the international commercial fleet. Furthermore, the
use of such personnel was not assessed to be a cost-
effective use of sparse military resources.19 Based on
that argumentation, the use of private security compa-
nies (PSCs) and ultimately PCASP teams in a commer-
cial setting was pursued as the alternative solution.
Accordingly, a dire need for national and international
legal instruments emerged to define authorisation crite-
ria, set standards for the application of PCASP teams
and ensure control in the form of oversight mechanisms.
It is especially distinct within the field of shipping
because of the structural compliance deficit following
from the great distance between Danish authorities and
piracy-prone waters, where it can become relevant to
deploy armed guards.
15. United Nations, Monitoring Group on Somalia, Report, 10 December
2008, para. 131.
16. Antipiracy strategy 2015, 16.
17. Petrig, above n. 12, 669.
18. Antipiracy strategy 2011, 23.
19. Ibid.
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1.2 Overview of the Regulatory Framework
According to the flag State principle as defined in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,20
ships are subject to the nationality of the state whose
flag they are entitled to fly.21 This includes the obliga-
tion to ‘effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical and social matters over ships
flying its flag’.22 The exclusive jurisdiction bestowed
upon flag States grants primary prescriptive competence
and enforcement powers. For many good reasons, how-
ever, the overall regulation of shipping follows from the
international and regional levels.23 Shipping is one of
the most global industries, which is fortified by the pro-
found number of marine and maritime-specific treaties
governing the sector.24 Denmark holds a long-standing
tradition of submission when it comes to ratifying
regional and international agreements. As most treaties
were drafted in a time when piracy was considered as a
historical phenomenon,25 these instruments do not
entail much regulation regarding piracy and especially
the use of armed guards.26 As articulated in 2011 by the
UN’s specialised agency, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), the absence of applicable regula-
tion and industry self-regulation coupled with complex
legal requirements gives cause for concern.27 According-
ly, the legal framework is generally described as com-
plex and in a state of flux.28 To mend the lacunas in
international law, a body of what is commonly referred
to as soft law and industry self-regulation (ISR) has
emerged to supplement flag State rules. It includes,
inter alia, the four IMO interim guidances drafted by
the Maritime Security Committee (MSC)29 and the
20. The 1982 United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter
the UNCLOS).
21. UNCLOS Art. 91.
22. UNCLOS Art. 94, Subsection 1.
23. K.M. Siig, ‘Private Classification Societies Acting on Behalf of the Regu-
latory Authorities within the Shipping Industry’, 482 SIMPLY 220
(2016).
24. Available at: http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfCon
ventions/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited 1 February 2019).
25. Petrig, above n. 2, 843.
26. UNCLOS Arts. 100-07 and 110 focusing on state’s rights and obliga-
tions pertaining to the repression of piracy.
27. IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), ‘Revised Interim Guidance to
Private Maritime Security Companies Providing Privately Contracted
Armed Security Personnel On Board Ships in the High Risk Area’
(25 May 2012) MSC.1/Circ.1443, Annex (1).
28. Petrig, above n. 12, 668.
29. MSC.1/Circ.1443; IMO Maritime Safety Committee, ‘Revised Interim
Recommendations for Flag States regarding the Use of Privately Con-
tracted Armed Security Personnel On Board Ships in the High Risk Area’
(12 June 2015) MSC.1/Circ.1406/Rev.3; IMO Maritime Safety Com-
mittee, ‘Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States regarding
the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel On Board
Ships in the High Risk Area’ (16 September 2011) MSC.1/Circ.1408;
IMO Maritime Safety Committee, ‘Revised Interim Recommendations
for Port and Coastal States regarding the Use of Privately Contracted
Armed Security Personnel On Board Ships in the High Risk Area’
(25 May 2012) MSC.1/Circ.1408/Rev.1; IMO Maritime Safety Com-
mittee, ‘Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators and
Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Person-
nel On Board Ships in the High Risk Area’ (25 May 2012) MSC.1/Circ.
1405/Rev.2.
industry’s Best Management Practices30 as the most
prominent examples. Other instruments that have
gained momentum include the world’s leading shipping
association BIMCO’s standard contract, Guardcon, for
the employment of security guards on vessels.31 The
ambit of Guardcon is to govern the contractual relation-
ship between the ship owner and the PSC; however,
Guardcon also affects areas of public law. Most notably,
the contract seeks to govern the relationship between
the master of the ship and the PCASP team, which is
basically a question of maritime law and criminal law.32
Another entity of relevance is the International Organi-
zation for Standardization (ISO). ISO has promoted a
standard for PSC accreditation.33 This standard is vol-
untary unless made mandatory in national law or
according to a de facto requirement articulated by ship
owners themselves or other relevant stakeholders, for
example, cargo owners and insurance companies.34 Both
BIMCO and ISO’s status in shipping ‘governance’ is
fortified by their consultative status to IMO. In addition
to these international legal instruments, Danish stake-
holders have issued a guideline in which compliance to
international guidelines and standards is emphasised.35
Though it makes sense – at least from a more practical
perspective to involve private actors in law-making ini-
tiatives – it also underpins the regulatory uncertainty, as
the interaction between traditional state-based sources
of law and ISR is immensely complex.
A follow-up question triggered by the mosaic of differ-
ent sources of law pertains to administrative and crimi-
nal sanctions. This is especially relevant from a Danish
perspective, as the transition from a state-controlled
regime to delegation of authority to private actors basi-
cally means that the ship owner or the contracting PSC
becomes responsible for actions which affect the author-
isation and the actual deterrence act at sea. Obligations
that are traditionally considered as administrative tasks
performed by governmental institutions and state agents
only. Such degree of flexibility comes with a price in the
form of potential criminal liability. Accordingly, formal
sanctions can be imposed in case of any violations, for
example, if the vetting of the guards does not meet the
requirements or the permit has expired. This is not less
30. Best Management Practice to Deter Piracy and Enhance Maritime
Security in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea
(June 2018; hereinafter BMP5) replacing Best Management Practice for
Protection against Somalia-Based Piracy (August 2011; hereinafter
BMP4).
31. Baltic and International Maritime Council’s standard contract for the
employment of security guards on vessels (Guardcon). A copy of
Guardcon can be obtained from BIMCO’s webpage https://
www.bimco.org/
32. Guardcon, Part II, cl. 8.
33. ISO 28007-1:2015 Ships and Marine Technology – Guidelines for Pri-
vate Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) Providing Privately Contrac-
ted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) On Board Ships (and Pro Forma
Contract) – Part 1: General (ISO 28007).
34. Protection and indemnity insurance (P&I insurance) are immensely
important to the ship owners, as any loss of insurance can have detri-
mental implications.
35. Guidelines for navigation waters with a piracy threat, including the use
of private armed guards, no. 3/2014. Available at: https://
www.danishshipping.dk/politik/pirateri/ (last visited 1 February 2019).
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relevant to the potential use of force in self-defence.
From a normative perspective, less is often required to
impose administrative penalties, such as when it comes
to withdrawing an existing license. From a criminal law
perspective, however, the fundamental principles of
legality and lex certa may constitute a curtailment on
applying various soft laws and ISR instruments as a
legal basis.
1.3 Objective and Content
The purpose of this article is to examine and evaluate
the current state of law for the use of PCASP on Danish
ships, by focusing on the authorisation scheme and the
use of force in self-defence, respectively. On the back-
ground of these thematic cornerstones it is argued
throughout this contribution that the Danish form of
regulation can be characterised by a high degree of
involvement from private actors. This statement is sup-
ported by the level of delegation of authority admitted
to private actors as well as the fact that the legal frame-
work relies on the interplay between formal and infor-
mal sources of law. The latter category covers soft law
and ISR instruments which are fully or in part formula-
ted by private actors. This interrelationship is a well-
known feature in shipping regulation, but when it comes
to gun regulation and the use thereof, it is unpreceden-
ted in Danish law. From a methodological perspective
some distinct challenges can therefore be identified
when analysing the use of private armed guards from a
Danish flag State perspective. First, attention is devoted
to the interplay between the various sources of law and
to what degree the soft law and ISR instruments are
binding. Second, taking the sparse specific national reg-
ulation into consideration, the question of interpretation
arises. The article is structured in four parts. Section 2
focuses on the authorisation. It outlines the background
and development towards the current dual licensing,
comprising the individual license and the general
license, respectively.36 On that background the analysis
is conducted. Section 3 concerns the protection against
piracy with a special emphasis on how to operationalise
the use of force in self-defence as well as the interaction
between the master of the ship and the PCASP team.
The examination is concluded in Section 4 with some
general remarks reflecting on the nexus between the
need for flexibility and fundamental principles of state
control. Finally, an outlook for the future of the Danish
form of regulation and some de lege ferenda proposals are
articulated.
2 Authorisation
From the time it was decided to allow PCASPs on board
Danish ships, the process of formalising an authorisa-
tion scheme commenced. In that process, two regulatory
36. The notions ‘individual license’ and ‘general license’ are not terminolog-
ically defined in Danish law, but the terms are commonly used by the
Ministry of Justice and accordingly applied in this article.
barriers needed to be addressed.37 One is the question of
obtaining weapon permits and the other aspect concerns
the selection of PSCs and vetting of their personnel.
Taking these themes into consideration, both areas of
law are subject to fundamental principles, including but
not limited to state control and oversight mechanisms.38
In accordance with the introductory articles of the
Weapons Act,39 it is illegal to import, manufacture, pos-
sess or use firearms and related equipment unless a cer-
tificate is obtained beforehand.40 Certificates are issued
on a strict basis, and a prerequisite for granting a certifi-
cate is the applicant’s personal behaviour and mental fit-
ness, proving that the person is not considered ‘unfit’.
Denmark has a very strict gun regulation, thus only
allowing firearms for hunting. Likewise, it is a basic
requirement for private actors engaging in commercial
security-related services, that an authorisation has been
granted and that all individuals acting as guards are vet-
ted by the authorities.41 Private security guards acting in
civil society are not allowed to carry weapons of any
kind, nor do such persons have any formal competence
to use force. Private security guards are thus bound by,
and confined to, the same rules as all individuals when it
comes to acting in self-defence and making civil arrests.
As a result, no obvious link can be drawn between the
Weapons Act and the Private Security Service Act apart
from the underlying principles articulated here.
Keeping these regulatory barriers in mind, the Ministry
of Justice decided to broaden the scope for issuing
weapon permits to allow the so-called individual license.
Furthermore, the need for rules on the scope of applica-
tion, type of ships and maritime safety aspects had to be
taken into consideration. As a result, the first individual
license for the use of PCASP was granted in March
2011 pursuant to the legislation in force at that time. No
amendment was thus required, solving the need for a
legal basis. This hands-on ministerial approach was for-
tified by the government’s promise to ‘adopt a more
open approach to the use of armed civilian guards, so
that it will no longer – as it has previously been the case
– be necessary to substantiate a specific and extraordina-
ry threat against the ship in question’ and the govern-
ment further committed to maintain a ‘close dialogue
with the industry in order to make the application pro-
cess as flexible and un-bureaucratic as possible’.42 This
policy statement underpins the delicate balance between
upholding the fundamental principles of state control,
within an industry well-known for its structural lack of
37. The Danish model of regulation is heavily inspired by the Norwegian
pilot scheme, which was among the first regulatory frameworks with
substantive content; see Bill proposal L 116 (2011-2012), 7-8.
38. C. Frier, ‘Autorisation af vagtvirksomhed og godkendelse af vagter i
dansk ret’, in Juridiske emner ved Syddansk Universitet 2015 (2015)
277-278.
39. Weapons Act (LBK no. 1005, 22 October 2012).
40. Weapons Act, Arts. 1 and 2.
41. Private Security Service Act (LBK no. 112, 11 January 2016) Art. 3 and
the supplementary Private Security Service Ordinance (BEK no. 1408,
4 December 2017) Art. 5.
42. Antipiracy strategy 2011, 25.
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oversight mechanism, and the dire need to accommo-
date the industry’s call for a more flexible authorisation.
An individual license is granted on a single basis and is
tied to an individual person with a specific weapon for a
named ship and a predetermined route. The authorisa-
tion is subject to thorough vetting procedures in the
form of personal background checks of the potential
guards. It also includes information regarding the
applied ship protection measures and the intended voy-
age. The list of information which the ship owners must
be adhering to is promulgated on the ministry’s web-
page.43 The examination involves at least two state insti-
tutions besides the Ministry of Justice, namely, the
Ministry of Defence (routing) and the Danish Maritime
Authorities under the auspices of the Ministry of Indus-
try, Business and Financial Affairs (procedure).44 Con-
sequently, the individual license largely observes the
fundamental principle of administrative control. One
important point to note, however, is the case processing,
which takes at least two weeks and possibly longer if the
application includes persons with foreign nationality.45
For practical reasons, this timespan was subject to con-
tinuous industry criticism, as the level of flexibility did
not match the business model of shipping.46 To fully
understand the individual license’s lack of flexibility and
the reason for ship owners becoming more vocal, it is
essential to understand some features pertaining to the
carriage of goods by sea. There are many ways in which
a ship can be utilised in trade, and the decisive factors
are related to economic incentives.47 A general distinc-
tion can be drawn between liner trade and chartering.
Liner trade, or carriage of general cargo as referred in
international conventions,48 is generically defined as
transportation of cargo against freight on a predeter-
mined schedule and route. The prefixed conditions
ensure that the line operator can foresee the need for
rerouting or additional protection depending on the
anticipated threat in the given trading area. This is vast-
ly different in chartering. Especially if a ship is fixed on
a time charter under which the charterer assumes the
commercial control, meaning that the master is bound
to perform voyages as per instruction by the charterer,
subject to the contract of carriage. Shipping is a finan-
cially sensitive business, and it is therefore of utmost
importance that ships can be redirected on a short
notice, and even shorter than the two weeks expected
for granting an individual license. Because the waters
43. Now available on the homepage of the Danish Police see https://
politi.dk/soeg-om-tilladelse/vaaben/civile-bevaebnede-vagter-paa-
danske-lastskibe (last visited 1 February 2019).
44. See particularly Section 2.1.
45. P. Cullen, Surveying the Market in Maritime Private Security Services in
Maritime Private Security, Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism and
Waterborne Security Risks in the 21st Century (2012) 31-35.
46. J. Berndtsson and Å.G. Østensen, ‘The Scandinavian Approach to Pri-
vate Maritime Security – A Regulatory Façade?’, 46 ODIL 144 (2015).
47. T. Falkanger, H.J. Bull and L. Brautaset, Scandinavian Maritime Law
(2017), 255-7.
48. The Norwegian Maritime Code, which is the best available translation
of the Danish ‘Søloven’ can be obtained on http://folk.uio.no/erikro/
WWW/NMC.pdf (last visited 1 February 2019).
around Africa, particularly the waters off the coast of
Somalia, are pivotal to everyday trade, it would consti-
tute a considerable contractual curtailment, if this
region was not part of the so-called ordinary ‘world-
wide trading’ clause agreed in many time charter par-
ties. Another point of criticism has been directed at the
specific tie to a named guard, meaning that a weapon
permit cannot be transferred in case the original holder
is prevented, ultimately placing the ship owners
between a stone and a hard place, when deciding to hon-
our a contractual promise of transport and taking the
seafarer’s safety into consideration.
Eventually, the practical shortcoming prompted a legal
reform in 2012 with the scope of granting easier access
for ship owners to obtain a ‘general license’. This policy
change reflected the intention of industry dialogue. The
Minister of Justice stated in his bill proposal speech that
‘the underlying reason for the proposed bill is that the
current licensing scheme [the individual license] has
proven to be difficult to reconcile to the needs of the
shipping industry, which is to the detriments of the
safety of the seafarers’.49 Consequently, the transition
from a state-controlled baseline to delegation of authori-
ty to private actors means that the ship owners or con-
tracting PSCs become responsible for different assign-
ments pertaining to the authorisation and vetting pro-
cess.
The outcome is laid down in Article 4c in the Weapons
Act, which stipulates that ‘the Minister of Justice…,
grants shipping companies a general license to use civil-
ian armed guards aboard cargo ships flying the Danish
flag.’ According to paragraph 2, ‘the Minister of Justice
shall lay down terms and conditions for the issuing and
use of permits pursuant to subsections 1.’ Article 4c is
structured so that the first rule concerns the authority to
grant a general license, whereas the second rule address-
es the subject matters which the ministry must take into
consideration when drafting secondary legislation at the
administrative level. This entails: the form and content
of an application, requirements for weapons and ammu-
nition types and their storage, keeping a weapon log, the
eligibility of the guards, reporting in case of attacks and
the validity of the license.50 The rules are codified in the
ministerial ordinance named the Use of Armed Civilian
Guards on Danish Cargo Ships (ACG Ordinance).51 As
the ACG Ordinance also accompanied the bill proposal,
it could be argued that it is rubber-stamped by the par-
liament’s voting.
Ultimately, when a Danish ship owner decides to hire a
PSC team for any given voyage, it is possible to apply
for an individual or general license. Keeping in mind
that the latter was modelled to meet the needs of the
shipping industry and reduce administrative bureauc-
racy, it is fair to assume that it has developed into the
preferred solution. According to information obtained
49. See L 116, ‘Skriftlig fremsættelse’ (28 March 2012). Author’s underlin-
ing and translation.
50. Weapons Act, Art. 4c(2).
51. BKG no. 698 om brug af civile bevæbnede vagter på danske lastskibe
(27 June 2012).
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from a requested access to formal records from the Min-
istry of Justice, it is indeed the case. To break down the
numbers, three cut-off dates should be noted. The first
date is March 2011 when the first individual licenses
were granted. The second date is June 2012 when the
general license came into force, providing ship owners
with an alternative solution. Finally, ultimo 2017 when
the information was obtained.52 During this time span, a
total of 158 individual licenses had been issued, but only
17 in the wake of the legal reforms. This indicates the
ship owner’s preference. With regard to the general
license, a total of sixty-nine have been issued within the
period. The general license is granted on a one-year
basis. When dividing the number of licenses against the
six-year time span, it indicates that around ten to twelve
shipping companies hold a general license at any given
time.53 It seems plausible given the number of ship
owners with Danish-flagged ships under their com-
mand. On that background the following analysis focu-
ses primarily on the form, content and effect of the gen-
eral license as it has developed into the preferred
license.
2.1 Ship Protection Measures
It is important to note that the use of PCASP is consid-
ered as a supplement and not an alternative to general
ship protection measures. A prerequisite for granting a
license in the first place is that the ship is sufficiently
secured according to vessel type and an overall risk
assessment of the intended voyage. The ambit is to
ensure that shipping activities are performed in a safe
manner, without putting the seafarer’s lives at risk or
endangering the marine environment.54 The special
ordinance is the Technical Standard for Precautionary
Measures for Piracy and Armed Robbery (Antipiracy
Ordinance) administered by the maritime authorities.55
The ordinance must be adhered to for all voyages in
piracy-prone waters, regardless of the use of PCASP
teams. The main obligation bestowed upon the ship
owner is to make a procedure as introduced in Section 2
earlier. Procedure in the most simplistic meaning of the
word refers to a series of acts in a particular order of
succession. In relation to a ship’s safety management
system, a procedure sets standards of conduct, and the
instrument functions as a barrier against unwanted and
unsafe activities.56 The procedure must, according to
Article 6 of the Antipiracy Ordinance, encompass
52. Obtaining this information has proven to be quite laborious because it
requires formal consultation from each ship owner. Apparently, this
information is considered a ‘trade security’, which means the Ministry of
Justice is reluctant to provide numbers.
53. A license is linked to the document of compliance (DOC). For more
information on the DOCs, see Falkanger, Bull and Brautaset, above n.
47, chapter 3. Separate DOCs will usually be issued for each division,
e.g. tanker division and container division. Ship-owning companies will
potentially have to obtain multiple general licenses.
54. Sea Safety Act (LBKG no. 1629, 17 December 2018) Art. 2 mirroring
the principles in the SOLAS Convention.
55. BEK no. 1084, 23 November 2011.
56. Danish Maritime Accident Investigation Board, Safety Report (June
2016), Tilted ‘Proceduralizing Marine Safety – Procedures in Accident
Causation’, 6.
instructions on prevention of pirate attacks. This
includes, inter alia, a general risk assessment of the
intended route, application of appropriate measure for
the protection of crew and ship, and training and
information sharing.57 The ordinance consists partly of
substantive rules, such as reporting requirements, and
partly of references to other legal instruments. Thus,
the Antipiracy Ordinance is an example of national sup-
port to international guidelines, which is developed by
IMO as well as the industry in the form of Best Man-
agement Practices. It is not a formal codification in
casu,58 but rather a ‘rule of reference’, meaning that the
ship owners must take the various legal instruments into
consideration, when preparing the procedure. A supple
style of regulation well-known within maritime safety
that tolerates changes without the need of amendments
in national law. On the other hand, this approach allows
rather drastic changes to the underlying guidelines.
In assessing the precautionary measures to be taken on
each ship, the risk assessment shall be evaluated on the
basis of the ship’s characteristics, for example, size, type
of cargo, freeboard and speed. This means that the
threshold for compliance pertaining to coasters and ves-
sels with cargo stowed below the water surface are gen-
erally higher than large container vessels. If the ship is
intended to navigate in the defined high-risk area,59 the
ship owner must also adhere to additional measures,
including those listed in BMP.60 Accordingly, it can be
concluded that IMO guidelines and ISR instruments are
mandatory, despite the combination of vague recom-
mendations leave the ship owner with an assessment.
To evaluate procedures a distinct system has evolved in
shipping, as compliance control is generally exercised by
private classification societies acting on behalf of the
maritime authorities.61 This is also the case with the
Antipiracy Ordinance.62 This practice supports the
notion of ‘privatisation’ because it relies on each ship
owner’s ability to adopt high-standard procedures as
well as the recognised organisations control hereof.
2.2 Scope of Application and Requirements
The ACG Ordinance is almost only governing the
authorisation process itself. Few articles, however, are
governing the situation on board the ship. One article
details the obligation to keep a weapons log and another
article refers to the duty of reporting in case of an inci-
dent that has caused the use of force in self-defence.63
These obligations will be discussed more in detail in
Section 3.
57. Art. 6, para. 1, no. 1-6.
58. An example of more formal codification of IMO guidelines can be seen
in the German model of regulation, see the contribution of Salomon in
this special issue.
59. BMP5, 2.
60. BMP5 entails a comprehensive list of actions and precautionary meas-
ures, such as razor wire, CCTV-monitoring citadels/safe muster points,
see BMP5, 11-20.
61. See e.g. T. Falkanger, ‘Hans Jacob Bull and Lasse Brautaset’, Scandina-
vian Maritime Law 92 (2017).
62. Antipiracy ordinance, Art. 12.
63. Arts. 6 and 8.
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A general license can be obtained for commercial voy-
ages performed by cargo ships within a geographical
area with a risk of pirate attacks or armed robbery.64
Passenger ships, fishing vessels and pleasure crafts are
instead referred to the individual license.65 An applica-
tion according to Article 3 must include identification of
the ship-owning company, including its place of busi-
ness and relevant contact details. If the ship owner and
the ISM responsible are not the same entity, the latter
must also support the application.66 The applicant shall
also confirm that procedures for precautionary measures
are developed and circulated among relevant parties, for
example, crew members, for familiarisation.67 Finally, it
is required by the ship owner to state the concrete need
for PCASP protection and why the precautionary meas-
ures are not adequate to prevent pirate attacks.68 The
latter requirement appears to be irrelevant, as the gener-
al license is not related to one specific voyage, as it is the
case with the individual license.
The obligation to present the necessary information is
not subject to criminal liability, as any lack of compli-
ance will lead to rejection. The validity of a general
license extents to one year,69 and during that period it
may be utilised as often as the ship owner finds it neces-
sary, of course within the scope of application. Surpris-
ingly, there is no duty to inform Danish authorities pri-
or to the embarkment of PCASP. On that background it
can broadly be stated that the lax requirements accom-
modate the industry’s call for flexibility.
2.3 Regulation of Private Security Companies
Another issue that must be addressed in detail is the
regulation of PSCs which offer services in the Danish
market. The regulation of PSCs has become the centre
of attention in the international debate, which can be
traced to similar discussions on the use of PSCs in war-
zones and areas of conflict.70 The concerns relating to
the use of private security providers are generally over-
lapping, focusing on accountability and liability.71 How-
ever, the legal framework governing the two distinct
areas is vastly different. Humanitarian law and the laws
of war are generally applicable in war and conflict situa-
tions, whereas maritime law is applicable at sea.72
Accordingly, IMO is thus regarded as a pioneer when it
comes to PSC initiatives, essentially suggesting that flag
States should have a firm policy and establish an appro-
64. Art. 1, para. 2.
65. Art. 1, para. 1.
66. Art. 3, para. 2, no. 2.
67. Art. 3, para. 2, no. 5.
68. Art. 3, para. 2, no. 6.
69. Art. 9.
70. E.g. A. Petrig, ‘Looking at the Montreux Document from a Maritime
Perspective’, 2 Maritime Safety and Security Law Journal (2016).
71. Y.M. Dutton, ‘Gunslingers on the High Seas: A Call for Regulation’, 24
Duke JCIL 107, at 123-8 (2013); J. Kraska, ‘International and Compara-
tive Regulation of Private Maritime Security Companies Employed in
Counter-Piracy’, in D. Guilfoyle (ed.), Modern Piracy: Legal Challenges
and Responses (2013) 222.
72. D. Guilfoyle, ‘The Use of Force against Pirates’, in M. Weller (ed.), The
Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (2015)
1063-1064.
priate legal framework for the use of PSCs.73 Dating
back to 2009 and in the following years, the question
pertaining to the use of PSCs has been a recurring item
on the agenda of IMO. States, industry stakeholders,
NGOs and private entities have all taken part in influ-
encing IMO’s position and guidelines,74 with an empha-
sis on flag State responsibility. Surprisingly, the Danish
Government has to a certain point derogated from this
point, as PSCs’ services performed on ships in interna-
tional and foreign waters fall outside the scope of the
Security Service Act, thus leaving maritime PSCs
unregulated. This is clarified by the Ministry of Justice
on several occasions because the statute is confined to
the Danish territory.75 Whether this interpretation can
be substantiated or not is subject to some scholarly
debate,76 but it seems striking that the government
refrained from regulating the topic at all. The absence of
a PSC-specific regulation might very well be preferable
from an economic point of view because Danish ship
owners are not confined to what can perhaps develop
into a monopolistic or oligopolistic market, with few
authorised providers and limited competition. On the
other hand, it raises the question of how it can be ensur-
ed that PSCs are fit for the task. This is relevant to
avoid risking a race to the bottom-push by precluding
substandard contractors. Furthermore, it might be diffi-
cult for well-established PSCs to demonstrate their
qualifications. As an alternative, parties tend to turn to
private accreditation.
Most notable is the ISO 28007 standard,77 which has
gained international momentum as well as support from
IMO itself.78 Standards as a tool of control and harmo-
nisation hold a pivotal position in shipping in general.79
In that context, standards are instruments which define
criteria for the purpose of reaching an ideal, prearranged
model or outcome. Thus, it makes good sense to take
advantages of the organisational structure already in
place in ISO. However, standards do not create legal
obligations just by the mere fact of their existence, and
their ‘binding effect’ is based on voluntary support,
unless induced by a public legal norm.80 The current
state of Danish law does not induce a de jure obligation
73. IMO, MSC.1/Circ.1443, annex.
74. J. Kraska, ‘International and Comparative Regulation of Private Mari-
time Security Companies Employed in Counter-piracy’, Modern Piracy:
Legal Challenges and Responses 224 (2013).
75. Bill Proposal (L116 2011-2012), Q&A, S 1084 dated 7 December 2011.
76. Frier, above n. 38, 278-9.
77. Originally issued as a PAS (Publicly Available Specification); see IMO,
MSC 91/17/1 (21 September 2012), ISO PAS 28007 Ships and marine
technology – Guidelines for Private Maritime Security Companies
(PMSC) providing privately contracted armed security personnel
(PCASP) on boar ships (and pro forma contract – Part 1, submitted by
ISO.
78. IMO MSC.1/Circ.1443, annex.
79. C.N. Murphy and J. Yates, The International Organization for Stand-
ardization: Global Governance through Voluntary Consensus (2009)
50-51; S. Wood, The International Organization for Standardization,
Business Regulation and Non-State Actors – Whose standards? Whose
Development? (2012) 82.
80. M.A. Carreira da Cruz, ‘Regulating Private Maritime Security Compa-
nies by Standards: Causes and Legal Consequences’, 3 Maritime Safety
and Security Law Journal 66 (2017).
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to comply to the standard, though it appears that a de
facto demand from industry stakeholders has promoted
the use of ISO 28007. The standard is thus supported in
the Danish guideline.81 Nevertheless, this assumption
does not fully safeguard against careless ship owners.
The standard itself is directed to PSCs as the principal
addressee. Consequently, it is bestowed upon every
security provider to demonstrate ISO compliance. It
intends to delineate a comprehensive set of require-
ments to which a PSC must abide. This includes, inter
alia, legal, financial, management and risk perspectives
within its own internal organisation. It also adds exter-
nal relationships to the list, including national authori-
ties, ship owners, insurance companies and subcontrac-
tors. The standard is divided into six separate parts;
Parts 4 to 6 detail the normative content. Regarding the
question of authorisation, Section 4 concerning security
management system elements for PSCs stands out. It
serves as the basis of the standard and stipulates in sub-
sections what is expected from PSCs to comply with the
standard. For obvious reasons the standard exceeds the
non-existing demands in Danish law, but it also goes
further than the requirements listed in the Service
Security Act for PSCs operating at land. In summary, it
is fair to consider the standard as a wide-ranging due
diligence examination that aims to raise the bar signifi-
cantly.
2.4 Eligibility of the Guards
One of the most delicate topics concerns the eligibility of the
guards. According to Article 7 of the ACG Ordinance, the
ship-owning company must either undertake to vet the
guards or ensure that the contracting PSC can provide
documentation on adequate procedures. Given the
nature of shipping and the distribution of tasks, it is fair
to assume that the latter option is exercised on a general
basis. This represents a more extreme example of dele-
gation of authority between private actors, which is
most unusual in a Danish context. In the following sec-
tion, the requirements under Danish law are examined.
On that background it is evaluated if these requirements
are higher or lower than international standards.
To be considered eligible under Danish law, six criteria
shall be fulfilled,82 including identification, age of at
least twenty years and submission of criminal records.
These criteria are straightforward and do not presup-
pose any subjective assessment. The more critical crite-
ria include: (i) that the person has not been charged with
a felony, making him or her unfit to handle and use fire-
arms; (ii) that the person has sufficient experience using
firearms; (iii) that the person must possess the required
level of knowledge pertaining to the legal concepts of
self-defence and necessity;83 and finally, (iv) that per-
sonal circumstances may not make the approval alarm-
ing. Regarding the criminal record assessment, eligibili-
81. Guidelines for Navigation Waters with a Piracy Threat, Including the
Use of Private Armed Guards, No. 3/2014. Available at: https://
www.danishshipping.dk/politik/pirateri/ (last visited 1 February 2019).
82. ACG Ordinance, Art. 7, nos. 1-6.
83. Criteria further discussed in Section 3.
ty is not equal to zero tolerance. According to the pre-
paratory work, any conviction for offences inflicting
‘longer imprisonments’, because of homicide, man-
slaughter, arson and rape shall automatically be disqual-
ifying. Minor offences, unless following from the Weap-
ons Act, are not disqualifying per se. A colourful exam-
ple is provided in the preparatory work. ‘If a person by
mistake brings an otherwise illegal knife to public areas,
because he or she has used it legally for fishing an forgot
to store it properly, the person is not automatically dis-
qualified.’ Likewise, in the case of ‘bar fights the under-
lying circumstances shall be taken into consideration’.84
The complexity of such an assessment makes it contro-
versial to leave it with a ship owner or potentially a for-
eign PSC, especially because it induces an overlap
between the entitled and entrusted party. Experience
with firearms is considered fulfilled if the person can
demonstrate at least two years of police or military
employment.85 In this case it is not a factual require-
ment that experience is gained form Danish services,
and in most cases the guards are of foreign nationality.
In relation to the applicant’s personal circumstances, the
person should be deemed unfit, if he or she, appears to
be mentally or physically unable to function as a guard.
Surprisingly, the ordinance is silent when it comes to
how this kind of information should be obtained in the
first place. Consequently, the likelihood that such
information will come to the ship owner’s attention is
questionable, meaning that the PSCs’ willingness to
abide by the law and adopt high standards is pivotal to
secure the quality of PCASP teams.
When conducting a side-by-side examination of Article
7 and recommendations articulated in the IMO guide-
line and ISO standard, respectively, it becomes apparent
that both instruments impose higher standards than
Danish law. To name a few examples, the IMO guide-
line specifies that all guards shall receive a minimum
shipboard familiarisation training, demonstrate knowl-
edge of the ISPS and ISM codes and undertake medical
training.86 The ISO standard consist of four pages divi-
ded into the following topics: training and communica-
tion, with detailed instructions on qualifications.87
When it comes to the actual number of guards to be
deployed, the ordinance is also silent. According to gen-
eral recommendations, a PCASP team should be no less
than four persons.88 This allows the team to work in
pairs and in shifts. It would also mean that the team can
cover all angles on the ships and thereby eliminate blind
spots. Consequently, it is fair to conclude that the rec-
ommendations set forth in IMO guidelines and interna-
tional standards are well over the threshold of Danish
law. But since neither the IMO guideline nor the ISO
84. Preparatory work (L 116 2011-2012) 15; I.B. Møberg and C.A. Gulisa-
no, Civile, bevæbnede vagter på danske lastskibe, Juristen nr. 4 (2012)
208.
85. Preparatory work (L 116 2011-2012), at 15 (author’s underlining and
interpretation).
86. MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev. 2, Annex, at 4.
87. ISO 28007, at 12-16.
88. Guardcon, Part II, cl. 3.
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standard is considered mandatory in regard to the ACG
Ordinance it is ultimately entrusted to private actors to
ensure the guard’s quality.
2.5 Evaluation
The previous sections contain an examination of the
requirements to obtain an authorisation applicable
under Danish law. It entails two different licensing
schemes, which is vastly different in form and content.
The key issues discussed previously are competence to
issue a license, formulation of procedure for precaution-
ary measures, approval of routing, weapons, and espe-
cially the competence to vet the guards, as summarised
in Table 1. 
The column to the left entails the assignments that must
be observed during the authorisation process. As shown,
the individual license is subject to strict state control,
whereas the tasks are delegated to private actors accord-
ing to the general license. Consequently, the main dif-
ferences in terms of the individual and general licensing
schemes is two-fold. First, the purpose of the general
license is to untie the link between the individual guards
and the weapons certificates. Instead, the permit is
issued to the ship owner, which makes it less complica-
ted to embark and disembark weapons and guards. Sec-
ond, the general license is subject to a high degree of
delegation of authority, which is untraditional from a
Danish legal perspective. Thus, the industry-friendly
authorisation scheme demonstrates a minimum of state
involvement when it comes to gun regulation and con-
trol of private security providers.
3 The Use of Force in Self-
defence
Up until this point, the analysis has focused on the
authorisation, broadly speaking what is required before
a PCASP team can legally embark on a Danish-flagged
ship. From this point on, the scenery changes to the sit-
uation on board the ship at sea and the guard’s potential
use of force in self-defence. This perspective is only
subject to limited political consideration, despite being
at the absolute centre of attention in the international
debate.89 No focus has been allocated to discussing the
concept of ‘monopoly of force’, indicating that the gov-
ernment’s perception of the act is merely use of force
exercised by private actors in some form of ‘improved’
self-defence.
The problems of using private actors to protect com-
mercial ships against piracy are crystallised in three
ways. First, it is a question of using firearms without
inflicting unlawful harm to attackers and thereby risking
criminal liability. Second, the chain of command
between the ship’s master and the PCASP team has
turned out to be complicated as a potential dichotomy
between the master’s competence as the highest authori-
ty on the ship and the individual right to self-defence
may collide. Especially if the master believes the safety
of the ship is at risk,90 it raises the question of whether
the master has the authority, or even an obligation, to
order ceasefire. Legal issues can also materialise in the
form of complicity, as it is generally recommended that
the team leader consult the master when suspicious
activity is detected. Nevertheless, the master should
exercise caution in giving instructions to the team lead-
er, as it could be perceived as incitement for which
criminal liability can be imposed.91 Third, in the wake
of an attack the master must take certain post-incident
obligations into consideration.
3.1 Legal framework
International law does not provide an answer to the
question of use of force in self-defence for private actors
at sea. The legal framework for use of force by states
89. Dutton, above n. 71.
90. SOLAS Convention, chapter XI-2, regulation 8.
91. Penal Code Art. 21 ‘(1) Acts aimed at inciting or assisting the commis-
sion of an offence are punishable as attempts if the offence is not com-
pleted. (2) The penalty prescribed for an offence may be reduced for
attempts, especially where an attempt reflects little strength or persis-
tence of criminal intent. (3) Unless otherwise provided, attempts will
only be punished if the offence is punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding four months.’
Assignments Individual license General license
Competence to issue a license Ministry of Justice Ministry of Justice
Approve procedures include ship protection meas-
ures
Private classification societies on
behalf of the Maritime Authority
Private classification societies on
behalf of the Maritime Authority
Approve routing Ministry of Defence Ship owners
Approve weapons, including types and ammuni-
tion
Ministry of Justice Ship owners within the ambit of the
ordinance
Competence to vet the guards Ministry of Justice Ship owners or PSCs
Table 1 compiled by author.
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cannot be adopted for PCASP teams.92 Instead, the
main source to consult is the law of the flag State.93
In relation to a legal basis, the preparatory work is
silent.94 This is presumably because the authority to the
use of force in self-defence does not differ from the sit-
uation according to an individual license, meaning the
continuous application of the Penal Code as the norma-
tive framework. This assumption is also supported by
the ACG Ordinance’s Article 7(5) which stipulates that
all guards must possess a minimum level of knowledge
on self-defence (nødværge) and emergency law (nødret).
As it is the ship owner or the contracting PSC who must
ensure the eligibility of the individual guard, criminal
liability will fall to either party should the requirements
not be met; however, the individual guard must be
answerable for his or her actions. In summary, the use
of force shall be evaluated on the basis of the generic
rule on self-defence in the Penal Code.95 From a theo-
retical standpoint, it is less problematic to apply the
same rule for actions following from a pirate attack or an
‘ordinary’ attack in society. But the controversial and
disputable fact is the lack of substantive rules on how to
operationalise concepts such as proportionality and
necessity in practice. Especially, as the risk of using
weapons is relatively high, given the fact that PCASP
teams should only be deployed in piracy-prone waters.
In addition, the likelihood of causing personal injuries
or fatal harm in the case of shooting is apparent. Such
kind of improved self-defence by allowing guns is other-
wise reserved for state agents, such as police officers and
military staff. Apart from the obvious difference
between services of state agents and PCASP teams,
respectively, the former group is officially mandated.
Likewise, such personnel’s actions are clarified with the
help of administratively formulated guidance in the
form of the so-called use-of-force barometer drafted by
public authorities.96
To mend the lacunas, various ISR guidelines and, to a
certain degree the IMO, have addressed the subject
matter. The most pronounced examples are BIMCO’s
guidance on the use of force97 and the ‘100 Series Rules’
92. D. Guilfoyle, ‘The Use of Force against Pirates’, The Oxford Handbook
of the Use of Force in International Law (2015); B. Feldtmann, ‘Må
man skyde en pirat – Et indblik I den retlige ramme for statslige aktørers
magtanvendelse’, Fetsskrift til Nis Jul Clausen (2013) 130.
93. Petrig, above n. 12, 689.
94. K. Østergaard and M.L. Holle, ‘Pirateri – anvendelse af civile bevæb-
nede vagter om bord på danskflagede lastskibe’, Juristen (6) (2012)
292.
95. Danish Penal Code, Art. 13(1) ‘Acts committed in self-defence are
exempt from punishment if they were necessary to resist or ward off a
present or imminent wrongful assault and do not manifestly exceed the
limits of what is reasonable in view of the danger from the assault, the
assailant himself and the importance of the interest assaulted. (2) Any
person who exceeds the limits of lawful self-defence will be exempt
from punishment if the irregular act could reasonably be attributed to
the fear or excitement produced by the assault.’
96. I. Henricson, Politiret (2016) 271.
97. BIMCO Guidance on Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) by Privately Con-
tracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) in Defence of a Merchant
Vessel (MV; hereinafter BIMCO RUF). Can be obtained on BIMCO’s
webpage https://www.bimco.org/ (last visited 1 February 2019).
commonly dubbed RUF.98 The former guideline is
adopted by BIMCO as a supplement to the standard
contract Guardcon, and the latter is drafted by an Eng-
lish lawyer, both taking a starting point in English law.
For obvious reasons, it is plausible for private actors to
resort to existing instruments rather than drafting their
own set of guidelines. The drawback however is the
likely risk that ‘one size does not fit all.’ Although the
right to self-defence, as a legal norm negating criminal
liability, is considered as an almost universal principle,
the concrete objective and content of the rule may vary
among states.99 The same can be argued with regards to
the mental requirement of mens rea. To pinpoint a prac-
tical example, some jurisdictions detail a duty to retreat
before using force.100 Simply to rely on recommenda-
tions is therefore not only controversial but is also likely
in conflict with the principles of legality and lex certa. In
addition, it is not convincing to base a justification on
the line of argumentation that actions simply comply to
international soft laws or ISR instruments, which also
jeopardises the guard’s legal position. Notwithstanding,
the lack of alternatives in the ambit of these guidelines
must be examined.
According to the guidelines, the deterrence act can be
divided into an escalation phase and a de-escalation
phase, respectively, providing a graduated approach.
This is to ensure that guns are not used before the attack
is initiated or after it is fended off. When evaluating the
guidelines, it becomes evident that the escalation phase
is more nuanced and accordingly easier to operationalise
in practice. As a first and second step, the team leader,
shall advise the master, that he intends to invoke the
rules, allowing the guards to use non-kinetic warn-
ings.101 Such actions will in casu not quality as use of
force. Second, the guards can resort to firing warning
shots if the attackers fail to react. In case they continue
to approach the ship, it indicates that a pirate attack is
most likely in effect. Consequently, lethal force can be
used, but only as a last resort. This also means if less
harm can be exercised by firing at the skiff’s engine or
non-vital parts of the body, the guards shall choose to
cause a lesser degree of personal harm. In contrast to the
escalation phase, the de-escalation phase can be more
difficult in practice, as successive or prolonged use of
force is not allowed. It raises the question of how to
determine whether the pirates have withdrawn from the
attack. The guidelines do not provide much guidance on
this end of the spectrum but simply refer to the over-
arching principles of proportionality and necessity.102
98. The 100 Series Rules: An International Model Set for Maritime Rules for
the Use of Force, can be obtained by a simple search on the Internet
(hereinafter 100 series).
99. Petrig, above n. 12, 668.
100. U. Sieber and C. Kornils, 5 Nationales Strafrecht in rechtsvergleichender
Darstellung, (2010).
101. 100 Series Rule 1 and Rule 2. BIMCO RUF is divided into different
weapon stages: normal, heightened and stand to. It also contains differ-
ent types of firing, e.g. warning shots, disabling fire, deliberate direct
fire and, finally, use of lethal force, 4-5.
102. 100 Series Rule, 2; BIMCO RUF, 2.
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3.2 Chain of Command
The previous section addressed the question of use of
force in self-defence as it was to be performed in a phys-
ical vacuum, with no interference from other parties
than the attackers (pirates) and the defenders (guards).
This is of course in stark contrast to reality and the sit-
uation on ships which are isolated at sea. This circum-
stance has given rise to concerns regarding authority
and chain of command. The reason for this potential
conflict is the possible clash between the master’s posi-
tion as the highest authority on the ship as reflected in
international as well as national laws, and the guard’s
individual right to act in self-defence and in defence of
others. From the perspective of the master, the question
is basically to what degree he or she can maintain full
authority without being held criminally liable for the
actions of others. From the guard’s perceptive the ques-
tion can be summarised to whether they shall obey the
master, should he or she give instructions that a contin-
uous use of force is either considered unlawful or is like-
ly to bring the ship in distress at sea.
The starting point is that special competences are
bestowed on the master compared to most other private
employment relationships, as stipulated in the Seaman’s
Act.103 Once considered as ‘master under God’, the
rhetorical statement illustrates the almost unlimited
powers bestowed on the master to act on behalf of the
ship owner and instruct crew and passengers. The
authority of the master to act on behalf of the ship own-
er has been downgraded during the past century, due to
the development of electronic communication.104 Nev-
ertheless, when it comes to the daily operation, naviga-
tion and situations of peril to which actions without hes-
itation are required, the master is undoubtedly in
charge.
The interplay between the master and PCASP team has
not been debated by the parliament; however, the issue
is addressed in international law and various other legal
instruments. The narrative of most instruments is that
nothing shall be construed as a derogation of the mas-
ter’s authority. Instruments such as the 100 Series and
BIMCO RUF seek to mitigate the dichotomy by means
of communication. According to the guidelines, the
team leader shall not only advise the master in case of an
imminent threat but also inform the master that the
RUF is about to be invoked, meaning that the PCASP
team will step in front, and the team leader will be
responsible for all decisions in such a situation, except
for the master’s right to order a ceasefire.105 From a
criminal law perspective, this seems questionable, as the
right to self-defence cannot be confined by agreement,
and the individual guard’s right to self-defence it not
confined by lex specials, meaning the argumentation
becomes circular.
103. The Seaman’s Act (LBK no. 73; 17 January 2014), para. 51.
104. E.V. Hooydonk, ‘The Law of Unmanned Merchant Shipping – An Explo-
ration’, JIML 412 (2012).
105. BIMCO Guidance on Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) by Privately Con-
tracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) in Defence of a Merchant
Vessel (MV), at 3.
3.3 Post-incident Obligations
Surprisingly little attention has been directed to post-
incident obligations. This section will not present a
detailed analysis but merely provide an overview of the
problems arising after a pirate attack has been repelled.
The ACG Ordinance stipulates a reporting obligation in
the case of use of force. It is laid down in Article 8,
which consists of four subparagraphs. The starting
point is that the responsible ship owner must report any
use of force in writing within seventy-two hours of the
incident. A report shall include a description of the inci-
dent, including the persons involved and the intensity of
the use of force.106 In case audio and video recordings
are available, this should be included in the report.107 If,
however, there is reason to believe that the actions have
caused personal injury or death, reporting shall be given
immediately to the police.108 Special obligations are also
listed in the Antipiracy Ordinance. According to section
6, subparagraph 1, no. 6, the previously discussed pro-
cedures must entail recommendations to the master on
reporting to other ships in the area in case of a pirate
attack. The master is to inform and alert other ships,
whereas the obligation according to the ACG Ordinance
is to ensure that law enforcement measure can be taken
if necessary.109
Apart from the two special rules, both international laws
and national laws impose general obligations on the
master. One relevant issue is the obligation to render
assistance for persons at distress at sea as formulated in
the SOLAS convention chapter V, regulation 33.1. It
states that the
The master of a ship at sea which is in a position to
be able to provide assistance (…), is bound to pro-
ceed with all speed to their assistance (…). The duty
to assist must always be evaluated in regard to the
safety of the ship and persons on board.110
Another delicate issue is the master’s duty to investigate
potential offences and if necessary take further actions
to detain the parties.111 It means in theory that the mas-
ter, if possible, must evaluate the actions of the guards.
This is for obvious reasons a rather controversial, how-
ever necessary, obligation.
4 Concluding Remarks and
Outlook
At the time of writing, roughly hundred Danish-con-
trolled ships are navigating in piracy-prone areas at any
106. Art. 8, subpara. 2.
107. Art. 8, subpara. 4.
108. Art. 8, subpara. 3.
109. Bill proposal L 116 (2011-2012) 15-16.
110. See further discussions on the topic in B. Feldtmann, ‘What Happens
after the Defense: Considering Post-Incident Obligations of Masters
from the Perspective of International and Danish Law’, ODIL (2015).
111. The Seaman’s Act, Section 63.
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given time.112 Accordingly, most ship owners employing
Danish-flagged ships in one of these areas are expected
to hold a general license for the potential use of PCASP
teams. Since the LEOPARD incident in 2011 no suc-
cessful hijackings have been recorded against Danish
ships, albeit TORM announced two pirate attacks in
2013 and 2014, respectively.113 Unlike the hijacking
incidents, both of TORM’s ships were equipped with
armed guards that repelled the attacks, without inflict-
ing personal injuries to the crew or the pirates. Hence,
the use of armed guards is generally considered success-
ful.
Surprisingly little attention has been devoted to discus-
sing the topic in the political and national scholarly
debate. On that backdrop of the analysis it is fair to
argue that the Danish model of regulation holds a high
privatisation factor. Not only are PCASP teams the pre-
ferred solution over VPD teams, but the intensity of
delegation of authority to private actors is also unique.
This is evident by comparing with equivalent areas of
Danish law and the current state of law in other flag
States. Furthermore, it is demonstrated throughout this
article that the Danish form of regulation to some extent
relies on soft law and industry self-regulation, which
serve as guidance, without automatically obtaining the
status of formal law. In summary, Danish lawmakers
have chosen to regulate this complex area of law, tradi-
tionally subject to strict rules within the characteristic
regulatory framework of maritime law. As noted in the
introduction, the legal framework corresponds with the
legal policy concerns articulated by the parliament.
Nevertheless, as the nature of shipping hampers state
control and oversight mechanics, the Danish form of
regulation is not prone to criticism. Especially the fact
that it is the ship-owning company or the contracting
private security company that undertakes the selection
and vetting of the guards is disputable. Consequently,
the decision-making powers of the beneficiary party and
competent party are overlapping. In the case of the
guard’s use of force in self-defence and the question
pertaining to the mater’s authority, the lack of lex spe-
cialis leaves the involved parties in a grey zone. Fortu-
nately, no serious incidents have occurred so far, but
one could be fearful of skeletons in the closet, should
harm come to attackers or defenders.
Looking back in time, Danish lawmakers acted on the
request of the shipping industry and adopted new regu-
lations which accommodate the call for more flexibility.
This is largely praised by industry stakeholders,
opposed to the scepticism voiced by scholars. As the
subject matter is not currently on the political agenda,
no ambition to amend the current state of law has been
expressed. In summary, the Danish form of regulation
112. Danish Shipping, Policy Paper on Piracy 2017.
113. Statements: available at: http://www.torm.com/uploads/media_items/
10-11-2013-torm-kansas-deters-pirate-attack-1.original.pdf and http://
www.torm.com/uploads/media_items/torm-sofia-deters-suspicious-
approach-by-pirates.original.pdf (last visited 1 February 2019).
can be described as commercially convenient but doctri-
nally dubious.114
114. Siig, above n. 23, 242.
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